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Chapter 8
A Stress Test for the Private Employer
Defined Contribution System
David Wray
Beginning in the late 1980s, defined contribution (DC) plans began to
emerge as the preferred employer-sponsored retirement vehicle in the
United States. The trend from defined benefit (DB) to DC plans was
welcomed by some, while others worried that a sharp fall in asset values
might produce the collapse of the DC system. Some hypothesized that a
dramatic decline in the value of DC plan assets might induce plan partici-
pants to stop contributing and expose employers to litigation regarding
plan menu construction.
The year 2006 was a good one for private employer-sponsored DC plans
in the United States. Key indicators of growth for the system were positive,
with rising numbers of plans offered, increases in active participants, escal-
ating employer and employee contributions, and improvements in total
assets. In addition, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 made permanent
several regulatory changes removing impediments restraining the use of
automatic enrollment. But shortly thereafter, global financial markets
crashed and virtually every asset class lost value. Over the next year, many
401(k) participants were exposed to the largest market downturn they had
ever experienced.
In what follows, we examine initial data on the impact of the financial
crisis on the DC system, focusing on plan sponsor and participant choices.
Though we have no crystal ball, we conclude that many plans did well,
resulting in little change in employer sponsorship and employee participa-
tion. Moreover, account balances and contributions have recovered, bod-
ing well for the future of the DC system.
Responses to the crisis: plan sponsors
Despite the financial market downturn of 2008–9, private sector employers
by and large retained their plans and continued to make company
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contributions. Some adjusted plan design, and others changed how plan
assets were invested.
In terms of numbers of plans, the private DC system continued to grow.
According to the US Department of Labor (DOL, 2010), there were
669,156 private employer plans in 2008, up from 658,805 in 2007 and
645,971 in 2006. While 2009–10 data are not yet available, it appears that
in 2009 there were few plan terminations, except in the case of bank-
ruptcies, mergers, and acquisitions. The same data reports contributions
by plan sponsors to DC retirement plans rose from 2006 to 2008. Firms
contributed $120,267 million in 2008, up 19 percent from 2006. Moreover,
according to Profit Sharing/401k Council of America (PSCA, 2010a) sur-
vey data, most plan sponsors in 2009 maintained their matching and other
plan contributions; nevertheless, some 15 percent did suspend their 401(k)
matches, 4 percent reduced matching contributions, and 27 percent sus-
pended or reduced their profit-sharing/other nonmatching company con-
tributions, declines somewhat offset by the 5 percent of plan sponsors that
initiated a match or increased their match.
By 2010, according to PSCA (2010b) survey data, some firms began to
restore their plan contributions: 39 percent of those who had suspended
their matching contribution reestablished them, and 30 percent of those
who had reduced their match returned to normal levels. Also, 4 percent of
plan sponsors increased or initiated a matching contribution and 3 percent
of companies increased or initiated a nonmatching contribution. More-
over, 19 percent of companies suspending or reducing their nonmatching
company contributions restored them. Working in the other direction,
2 percent of companies reduced matching contributions (Figure 8.1).
All employees are not necessarily eligible to make contributions, nor
are they immediately eligible for company contributions as soon as they
begin working. According to PSCA survey data, prior to 1998, it was
standard practice to limit employee participation in a plan after one
year of service and attaining age 21. Since that year, service requirements
for eligibility were reduced and the trend continued through 2010.
Short-service requirements (fewer than three months of service) are
now common for participant contributions. In 1998, only about one-
quarter of DC plans allowed new hires to begin contributing immedi-
ately; by 2010, 60 percent of all plans permitted immediate participation,
and in 78 percent of plans, employees could participate within three
months of employment. Forty-four percent of plans have no minimum
age requirement for elective deferrals; the usual minimum age require-
ment, if there is one, is still age 21.
There has also been a continued trend toward immediate plan eligibility
for employer contributions, and twice as many plans provide immediate
eligibility for matching as for nonmatching contributions. Within three
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months of employment, 60 percent of plans make employees eligible for
matching contributions and 32 percent provide eligibility for nonmatching
contributions. Thirty percent of companies require one year of service or
longer for matching contribution eligibility, while over half of employers
require one year or more of service to be eligible for nonmatching com-
pany contributions according to PSCA survey data.
In many DC plans, employers enroll new hires as soon as the employees
are eligible; after that participant contributions are automatically deducted
from employee pay unless an employee instructs the employer otherwise.
According to Fidelity Investments (2011), automatic enrollment has spread
in the DC environment, from 10 percent of plans in 2006 to 24 percent of
plans by 2010.
In large firms with 5,000+ participants, automatic enrollment stood at 54
percent in 2009, up from 41 percent in 2006 (PSCA, 2009). Many employ-
ers will also select an investment portfolio to use as a ‘default’, absent
investment guidance provided by the participant. Such investment patterns
have changed substantially over time. In 2001, 48 percent of plans used
either a stable value or money market fund as the default portfolio; by 2009,
only 3 percent of plans used these funds (PSCA, 2010a). In their place, the
defaults are now target retirement date funds, with over half (57 percent)
using them in 2009.
When a DC plan permits participants to contribute after-tax dollars to a
401(k), under certain conditions, participants may take tax-free distributions
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Figure 8.1 Percentage of participants contributing to plans that ceased making
contributions by the year end: 2006–10
Source : Author’s calculations.
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of investment earnings. These are known as Roth 401(k) plans. Previously,
only after-tax participant contributions were allowed, with investment earn-
ings growing tax-deferred and taxable on distribution. The trend to Roth
401(k) plans has been impressive: in 2006, only 18 percent of firms allowed
participants to make Roth after-tax contributions, while in 2009 the rate had
more than doubled to 41 percent (PSCA, 2010b).
Education, plan support, and investment offerings
From the onset of the financial crisis, volatility in the financial markets bred
concern that employees might cease participating in their plans and/or
reallocate their account balances to risk-free investments. Consequently,
many employers with DC sought to enhance employee education and
provide participant support when needed. In 2008–9, over half (54 per-
cent) of plan sponsors increased plan education and communication
efforts (PSCA, 2010a, 2010b). Moreover, providers added to their call
centers to handle participant inquiries and ran numerous workshops.
Also during this period, plan sponsors recognized that some participants
needed far more than education, and many now help participants with
their investment allocation decisions with target-date funds, investment
advice, and professionally managed investment options. For example,
almost two-thirds (62 percent) of sponsors in 2010 offered target-date
funds, up from about one-third (35 percent) four years earlier (PSCA,
2010a, 2010b). Investment advice was offered in 60 percent of plans in
2009, up from 45 percent in 2006. Almost a third (31 percent) of plans
offered participants a managed account option in 2009, allowing partici-
pants to delegate plan allocations to professional managers selected by the
plan sponsor. In 2009, 19 percent of plans made all three of these options
available and only 9 percent of plans did not provide at least one (see
Table 8.1).
Many companies also increased the frequency with which they monitor
plan investment offerings, and a majority changed plan menus. For
Table 8.1 Percentage of DC plans offering target-date funds, professionally
managed accounts, and/or investment advice to participants
Offers % of plans
Offers all three options 18.6
Offers two of the three 35.8
Offers one of the three 36.5
Does not offer any 9.1
Source : PSCA (2010a, 2010b).
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instance, almost two-thirds (64 percent) of sponsors reviewed plan invest-
ment menus quarterly, up from about half (53 percent) in 2006. The
fraction undertaking a review annually fell from 27 to 18 over the same
period. Fifty-six percent of plan sponsors changed plan investments lineups
in 2010 (PSCA, 2010a, 2010b).
Responses to the crisis: participant behavior
As shown elsewhere in this volume (Tang et al., 2012), the vast majority of
401(k) participants showed substantial resilience in the face of stockmarket
volatility, falling housing prices, and overall economic uncertainty. Most
continued saving in their plans, maintained their saving rates, and
continued to hold diversified portfolios with the majority of the assets in
equities. They have been rewarded with increases in both median and
average account balances by the end of 2010 according to Vanguard (2011).
Participant contributions
Federal law limits the amount highly compensated employees (HCEs) can
contribute to their plans, compared to the nonhighly compensated. Evi-
dence suggests that the nonhighly compensated participants more or less
maintained their DC contributions despite the crisis. Thus, as a percentage
of pay, average contributions for nonHCEs eligible to participate (includ-
ing noncontributors), stood at 5.4 percent of pay in 2006, 5.6 percent in
2007, 5.5 percent in 2008, and 5.2 percent in 2009 (PSCA, 2010a). One
reason for the bump down is probably that some plans suspended
employer matching contributions, making employee participation less
attractive.
Distributions
Some 87 percent of private employer-sponsored DC plans permit their
participants to borrow from their accounts: federal rules limit the loans
to 50 percent of their account balances or $50,000, whichever is less. It is
generally thought that sponsors include this plan provision to encourage
participation and higher contribution rates, and to avoid hardship with-
drawals. Available evidence suggests that plan loan rates were virtually
unchanged over the period. As of 2006, 24 percent of participants had a
loan outstanding, given that they could borrow; as of 2009, the fraction was
23 percent. (Average loan amounts did rise from $7,766 to $8,760 accord-
ing to PSCA survey data.)
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A majority of plans, 86 percent, allow hardship withdrawals; common
reasons for permitting these include purchase of a primary residence, to
prevent eviction or foreclosure, for medical expenses, and to cover post-
secondary education expenses. The fraction of plan participants taking
hardship distributions has increased, but remains small: it was 1.5 percent
of eligible participants in 2006 and 2.2 percent in 2010 according to
Vanguard (2011).
Another way in which funds can leave DC plans is via lump-sum distribu-
tions. When a participant leaves an employer with an account balance, this
balance can be preserved by leaving the amount accumulated in the former
employer’s plan, rolling it over into a new employer’s plan, or rolling it into
an individual retirement account (IRA). Alternatively, the former
employee may also elect to take a lump-sum distribution, which will be
subject to income tax, as well as a 10 percent early withdrawal penalty (if
under the age of 59.5). Over the period under observation, there was little
change in participant behavior regarding distributions: for instance, in
2006, 72 percent of terminated vested participants did not cash out plan
assets, so that 93 percent of the available assets were retained in the system
(Vanguard, 2011). By 2010, the percentage declined only slightly: 70 per-
cent of terminating employees preserved their saving in a tax-qualified
program, amounting to 92 percent of available assets.
Balances and trading activity
Total assets in private sector DC plans increased from $3.55 trillion at the
end of 2006 to a historic high of $3.86 trillion by the end of 2010 (FRB,
2011). The median participant account across all eligible participants grew
from $25,953 in 2006 to $26,926 in 2010; the median account balance for
participants with an account in 2007 increased by 31 percent by the end of
2010. Average participant account balances grew from $75,791 in 2006 to
$79,077 in 2010 (Vanguard, 2011).
Most participants do not actively trade their DC plan portfolios. In 2006,
only fourteen of the participants made at least one trade or exchange; this
number rose slightly to 16 percent in 2008 and then fell back to 12 percent
in 2009 and 2010 (Vanguard, 2011). Moreover, the fraction of new con-
tributions going to equities in these plans remained relatively steady over
the period: in 2006, 72 percent of new contributions to DC plans went to
equities; in 2007, it was 74 percent; in 2009, it was 68 percent; and it
rebounded to 70 percent by 2010 (Vanguard, 2011). The commitment to
equities stood at 73 percent of the DC balances 2006–7, reaching a low of
61 percent in 2008 with the market shock. As the market rallied in 2009 and
2010, the percentage of plan assets in equities rebounded to finish at 68
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percent in 2010 (Vanguard, 2011). These trends resulted from several
factors, including the fact that employees continued to contribute new
money to equities, as well as the rebounding stock market.
Another look at the long-term trend is taken from private retirement
plan asset data reported by the Federal Reserve (2011). Here DC plans’
asset allocation has remained virtually unchanged from 2006 to 2010.
Additionally, private DC plan assets rose by 8.8 percent over the relevant
time frame.
Conclusion
Without a doubt, the past few years have been an unusually difficult period
for plan sponsors and participants in the DC arena. Nevertheless, most
private sector employers who had DC plans continued their sponsorship,
and the majority of employees and firms continued to contribute. It now
seems clear that the employer-sponsored DC system performed well in
difficult times, with little permanent decline in employer sponsorship or
employee participation. This permitted account balances and contribution
levels to recover as the economy improved.
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